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Privacy Considered and Jurisprudence Consolidated:  Ferdinand v MGN Ltd 
 
Introduction 
The most recent privacy decision by the English courts, Ferdinand v MGN Ltd,
1
 
brings together a number of key themes which have been developing in recent years, 
including the role of anonymised court reports and, critically, the relevant facts in 
assessing the public interest when determining whether the right to privacy has been 
infringed.  While hardly novel on its facts, there is nevertheless much of interest in 
this latest decision, which was handed down by Mr Justice Nicol.   
 
Perhaps one of the most striking things about the decision is that it demonstrates how 
rich a jurisprudence has developed in England in the relatively short period since 
October 2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”) came into force – and 
much of that dates from the landmark decision of Campbell v MGN Ltd in 2004.  
Whereas cases in the early days of the new order grappled with the difficulties of a 
need to respect privacy in a jurisdiction which had steadfastly refused to grant such a 
right (Kaye v Robertson
2
 was still only nine years old when the HRA came into 
force), the current legal analysis can draw on a fairly clear and settled body of case 
law.  This is certainly in evidence in Ferdinand, as Mr Justice Nicol cites over 12 
significant English decisions from the last decade, featuring a range of celebrities, 
footballers and other public figures.
3
  Moreover, certain cases are now recognised as 
landmark cases which have shaped the approach to recognising article 8 privacy rights 
and balancing them against the article 10 right to freedom of expression.  These cases 
comprise Campbell v MGN
4
; McKennitt v Ash
5
; Murray v Express Newspapers
6
; Re S 
(A Child)
7
; and Mosley v News Group Newspapers
8
.   
 
From the European angle, the judgment in von Hannover v Germany
9
 remains 
supreme, setting out the fundamentals of recognising the privacy (and its limits) of 
famous individuals – be they royalty, politicians, or celebrities.  The most recent 
addition to the European jurisprudence is Mosley v UK
10
, which was also cited in 
Ferdinand. 
 
The facts of the case 
One thing which English privacy cases typically share is that they involve celebrities 
and kiss and tell stories.  Baroness Hale’s popular description of Campbell v MGN 
can be applied to many
11
 of the parties that have featured in the litigation since then:  
“Put crudely, it is a prima donna celebrity against a celebrity-exploiting tabloid 
newspaper.”12  The present case is no different, with the Sunday Mirror publishing a 
                                                 
1 [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB), of 29 September 2011. 
2 [1991] FSR 62. 
3 Litigants have included Jamie Theakston, Garry Flitcroft, Fred Goodwin, John Terry, and Lord 
Browne of Madingley. 
4 [2004] 2 AC 457. 
5 [2008] QB 73 (CA). 
6 [2007] EWHC 1908 (Ch) and on appeal [2008] EWCA Civ 446. 
7 [2005] 1 AC 593. 
8 [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). 
9 (2005) 40 EHRR 1. 
10 App No 48009/08. 
11 With some notable exceptions, including McKennitt v Ash and Murray v Express Newspapers. 
12 [2004] 2 AC 457, para 143. 
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story on 25 April 2010 headed “My Affair with England Captain Rio”, the details of 
which were drawn from an interview with Ms Carly Storey, who had known Rio 
Ferdinand from 1997.  Although the interview was based on Ms Storey’s position, the 
court was able to draw on plenty of evidence from Ferdinand himself, from a range of 
newspaper interviews he had given over the years, together with extracts from his 
own autobiography.  These sought to paint a picture of a wild child who was now 
reformed, thanks to his family commitments to his wife and sons.   
 
Ms Storey’s decision to go public in April 2010 with details of their 13-year on/off 
affair arose from Ferdinand’s promotion to captain the English football team in 
February that year – ironically appointed to replace John Terry, who has also 
occupied the time and attention of the courts on privacy matters after an exposé of his 
extra-marital affair with the former girlfriend of an England team mate.
13
  Following 
Terry’s fall from grace in January 2010, England manager Fabio Capello had sought 
to appoint a replacement who would act not only as a leader on the pitch but as a role 
model off the pitch:  “I ask always that the captain is an example to the young, for the 
children, for the fans…a role model outside the game - in life as well.”14   
 
At this point, Ms Storey sent a text message to Ferdinand which said:  “Oh my you 
taking over jt what a joke, maybe its time I cashed in seen as you want 2 blank me.”15  
Following a brief response from Ferdinand (“Wot chattin about”), Ms Storey sent a 
further text saying “Sorry I sent you that text the other day it was supposed 2 be a 
joke, I can see that it might of upset you and I didn’t mean 4 that, I hope al is good 
anyway.  Remember always friends.”16   
 
Despite these reassuring words, Ms Storey had made contact with Max Clifford by the 
end of the month, and her story appeared in the Sunday Mirror two months later.  One 
point on which Ferdinand sought to rely in this action was that the Sunday Mirror had 
not notified him in advance of publication.  Although this was contrary to common 
media practice in the UK, Mosley v UK enabled the European Court of Human Rights 
to clarify recently (albeit after the publication in the present case) that there is no legal 
obligation for a person to notify the party involved prior to publishing private 
information.
17
 
 
Since Ferdinand was not notified prior to publication, and therefore had no 
opportunity to seek an injunction, the current action was a post-publication claim for 
infringement of his privacy.  The action was raised against MGN Ltd, and Ms Storey 
was not a litigant: indeed, she did not even give evidence in court, choosing instead to 
go abroad shortly before the trial.  Her witness statement was therefore available, but 
was not open to cross-examination. 
 
In addressing the claim, the court reiterated the (now well-established) process by 
which privacy issues are approached.  First, it must be ascertained if article 8 is 
engaged:  is the information in question “private” such that it is protected by article 8?  
                                                 
13 Terry (previously “LNS”) v Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 119 (QB). 
14 [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB), para 11, said by Capello when announcing Ferdinand’s appointment and 
quoted in the Sunday Mirror article that formed the basis of this litigation. 
15 [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB), para 24. 
16 [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB), para 24. 
17 Mosley v UK App No 48009/08. 
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If so, the court then needs to balance the privacy interest under article 8 with the right 
to freedom of expression under article 10, to determine whether the right to privacy 
must yield to expression.
18
 
 
Was the information protected in principle by article 8? 
There were three types of information in the Sunday Mirror’s article, all of which 
should be protected by article 8 according to the Claimant.  These were (i) text 
messages between Ferdinand and Ms Storey (and thus a form of correspondence); (ii) 
details of their sexual relationship; (iii) a photograph of Ferdinand and Ms Storey in a 
hotel room in 1997 (fully clothed and with others present).  As Campbell and Reklos 
have recognised, photographs typically deserve special protection, in part because of 
the insight they can provide to feelings and actions at the time.
19
  Although 
Ferdinand’s wife and children were not party to the litigation, there was also a claim 
that the article impinged on their right to privacy under the ECHR. 
 
One of the critical factors in the defence was the fact that Ferdinand had already 
talked publicly about his bad behaviour, including driving bans, affairs with other 
women when he was in a relationship with Ms Ellison (whom he subsequently 
married), and in particular what was referred to as the “Ayia Napa incident”, when 
Ferdinand had been filmed having sex with an unknown woman in Ayia Napa in 
2000.  These details had been raised by Ferdinand in interviews and in his 
autobiography (published in 2006).  He had referred to his behaviour, including in 
Ayia Napa, and then explained “I admit I got carried away with it at times but you get 
older, more responsible and leave that sort of thing behind.”20 
 
This public disclosure of certain improprieties was important to the defence for two 
reasons.  First, it indicated that the information was in the public domain, and 
therefore Ferdinand could have no expectation of privacy in relation to it.  Second, 
however, it illustrated his attempt to portray himself as a reformed character – as 
having moved on from his wild behaviour in his youth, to become a responsible 
family man.  This was a theme which was repeated in interviews he gave with the 
News of the World and the Daily Telegraph (both in 2006), and in the Times and 
Observer (both in 2008).
21
   
 
Despite these previous public references to his extra-marital affairs and other 
misbehaviour, Mr Justice Nicol concluded that the information disclosed did have the 
necessary quality to merit protection by article 8.  The first limb of the test was 
therefore satisfied in relation to the material published.  The text messages were 
accepted to be “correspondence” and therefore capable of protection.22  The 
photograph of both parties in a hotel room appeared to cause slightly more difficulty, 
since it showed “nothing remarkable”, but again the court held that it was capable of 
being “private”.23   
                                                 
18 [2011] EWHC 2454 (QB), paras 38-42, with reference to Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 
EHRR 1; Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457; Re S (A Child) [2005] 1 AC 593; and McKennitt v Ash 
[2008] QB 73 (CA). 
19 Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 457 and Reklos v Greece (App no 1234/05) (15 April 2009), [2009] 
EMLR 16. 
20 As quoted in the judgment, para 31. 
21 Again, as reported in the judgment, paras 30-35. 
22 [2011] EWHC 2454, para 55. 
23 [2011] EWHC 2454, para 54. 
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In relation to the information in the article regarding Ferdinand’s relationship with Ms 
Storey from 1997-2010, this too was considered to be private.  Although details about 
other affairs had been made public, Ferdinand’s relationship with Ms Storey was not 
widely known, but rather was confined to their family and friends.  In part, this was 
supported by the Sunday Mirror’s own description of their article as an “exclusive”.24  
In assessing the private nature of the information, Mr Justice Nicol observed that 
“[s]exual behaviour in private is part of the core aspects of individual autonomy 
which Article 8 is intended to protect.”25  While there may well be circumstances in 
which information about sexual activities is not protected, the circumstances will 
often be relevant at the second stage, in balancing privacy and expression, rather than 
at the prior stage of determining whether the information engaged article 8.  Issues 
such as Ferdinand’s role as capital of the England football team were considered to 
have no effect on this prior question.  Previous indiscretions did not remove an 
expectation of privacy – and nor did the fact that Ferdinand had not litigated on 
previous newspaper articles constitute a waiver or personal bar in respect of the 
present litigation.
26
 
 
It is submitted that this is the correct approach to these points.  Whether the Claimant 
has disclosed information about other conduct, or has previously chosen not to 
litigate, should not undermine the basic application of article 8.  If information is 
fundamentally “private” in nature, then external factors should not alter that.  
However, these factors may well have significance when it comes to the balancing 
exercise, and assessing whether article 10 considerations outweigh the protection to 
be given to that private information.    
 
The final submission, that the publication also infringed the privacy of Ferdinand’s 
wife and children, was given less weight by the judge.  This was primarily because 
there was no witness statement or evidence from Ms Ellison.
27
  However, the judge 
also noted that Ferdinand’s children were too young to fully understand, since they 
were aged three and one at the time of publication.  This is a more complex issue, 
since a physical invasion of privacy could easily arise in respect of someone who is 
unable to comprehend the nature of the invasion (such as where a coma patient is 
abused).
28
  It is therefore potentially troublesome to draw a line based on awareness of 
the infringement, and it should not always be necessary for the individual to 
understand or be aware of the infringement in order to suffer an invasion of privacy.  
However, it was not an issue which the court was required to tackle in this case.   
 
The Balancing Exercise:  Reconciling articles 8 and 10 
Having established that the information was prima facie private, the second stage was 
to consider the balance to be struck between privacy and expression.  The typical 
approach requires the court to treat each case on its own facts, placing “an intense 
                                                 
24 [2011] EWHC 2454 , para 52. 
25 [2011] EWHC 2454, para 56. 
26 [2011] EWHC 2454, paras 58-59. 
27 The significance of failing to bring evidence was also considered in Terry (previously “LNS”) v 
Persons Unknown [2010] EWHC 119 (QB). 
28 Civilian European jurisprudence deals with the subjective nature of certain personality rights and the 
difference between absolute and relative rights.  See for example Huw Beverley-Smith, Ansgar Ohly 
and Agnes Lucas-Schloetter, Privacy, Property and Personality (CUP, 2005). 
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focus on the comparative importance of the specific rights being claimed in the 
individual case.”29 
 
In focusing on the facts in question, two general principles were outlined by Mr 
Justice Nicol at the start of this exercise.  The first was that the public interest is 
critical, but any disclosure must make a genuine contribution to the public debate, and 
not just be of interest to the public:  “the contribution which the publication makes to 
a debate of general interest is the decisive factor in deciding where the balance falls 
between Article 8 and Article 10.”30  Lurid tittle-tattle will not attract the “robust” 
protection of article 10.
31
 
 
The second proposition was that the public interest is not confined to the exposure of 
conduct which is illegal.
32
  Thus, the public interest can be served by disclosure of 
information which reveals behaviour which is contrary to the individual’s public 
portrayal of himself, for example, even if it is not of itself criminal. 
 
While this is certainly a useful point, the opposite is not automatically true:  simply 
because the act in question is illegal will not automatically render invasion or 
disclosure in the public interest, and therefore protected by article 10.  This was 
explored by Mr Justice Eady in Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd, where he 
considered: 
Would it justify installing a camera in someone’s home, for example, in order 
to catch him or her smoking a spliff? Surely not. There must be some limits 
and, even in more serious cases, any such intrusion should be no more than is 
proportionate.
33
 
       
In fact, it has been recognised that even if disclosure of private information per se can 
be justified in the public interest, publication in the media may be unjustified.  It may 
often be more appropriate to disclose criminal conduct to the appropriate authority, 
such as the police, and serve the public interest in that way – rather than seeking to 
serve the interests of the public by publishing in a tabloid.
34
 
 
When assessing whether there is a public interest in the disclosure, one relevant aspect 
of this can be “correcting a false image”.35  Thus, as with Campbell, the Mirror 
claimed in its defence that, even if the information was private, it was in the public 
interest to expose Ferdinand’s hypocrisy and to set the record straight.  This requires 
the information to be disclosed to be true, since it must be accurate in correcting an 
                                                 
29 Re S (A Child) [2005] 1 AC 593, para 17. 
30 [2011] EWHC 2454, para 62. 
31 With reference to Mosley v UK App No. 48009/08, and Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 
1. 
32 [2011] EWHC 2454, para 63, with reference to Terry (previously “LNS”) v Persons Unknown 
[2010] EWHC 119 (QB). 
33 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777, para 112. 
34 Although note Ouseley J’s comment in Theakston v MGN Ltd [2002] EWHC 137 (QB) ([69]) that 
the ‘free press is not confined to the role of a confidential police force; it is entitled to communicate 
directly with the public for the public to reach its own conclusion’.  Moreover, it has been accepted that 
in some cases, disclosure in the press may be appropriate in order to communicate the relevant 
information where there are large numbers of entitled recipients: Lord Browne of Madingley v 
Associated Newspapers Ltd [2008] 1 QB 103, para 55. 
35 [2011] EWHC 2454, para 65.  The most high profile example of this is Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 
AC 457. 
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earlier false image projected by the individual.  Thus, where a defendant seeks to rely 
on the public interest in the information by virtue of correcting a false image, the 
defendant must demonstrate the probity of the information.  This can be contrasted 
with the normal position, as outlined by Mr Justice Nicol: 
Generally in a claim for publication of private information the Court is not 
concerned with whether the information is true or false.  A Claimant is not, for 
instance, expected to admit the truth of what has been published as the price of 
obtaining redress.
36
 
 
Thus, several factors will come into play when placing an intense focus on the 
specific facts of the case:  what is the alleged contribution to the public debate; was 
the conduct criminal; does the information correct a false image? 
 
The Final Outcome 
When these factors were taken into account by the court, Mr Justice Nicol concluded 
that the balance favoured expression, rather than privacy.  Ferdinand’s claim was 
therefore rejected:  the information disclosed was private information in terms of 
article 8, but the right to freedom of expression outweighed the privacy 
considerations.   
 
The main reason for this was Ferdinand’s prior conduct.  The disclosure was justified 
in the public interest, in order to “set the record straight” and correct the false image 
which Ferdinand had built up: 
Through that article [in the News of the World in 2006] he projected an image 
of himself and, while that image persisted, there was a public interest in 
demonstrating (if it were to be the case) that the image was false.
37
 
This image of a reformed character projected in the News of the World was 
compounded in other interviews given by Ferdinand and in his autobiography.  
 
A further contributing factor was Ferdinand’s appointment as captain of the England 
football team – a role which carried with it “an expectation of high standards… off, as 
well as on, the pitch.”38  While not being required to decide whether Ferdinand was fit 
for the role as captain, Mr Justice Nicol nevertheless concluded that the information 
published by the Sunday Mirror contributed to that debate in public.   
 
Whereas in Campbell, the House of Lords held that the newspaper was entitled to 
publish the information but not the photographic evidence, which was an added 
degree of intrusion and contributed nothing to the overall story, in this case the court 
reached a different conclusion.  Although Ferdinand had a reasonable expectation that 
the image of him and Ms Storey from 1997 would remain private, its publication 
added to the overall story, by corroborating the existence and length of their 
relationship.  Further, the nature of the image was “unexceptionable”, as it did not 
show any particularly private or intimate moment (in contrast to the Campbell 
images).
39
  It therefore failed to tip the balance in favour of the privacy right. 
 
Whose right to freedom of expression:  The Sunday Mirror’s or Ms Storey’s? 
                                                 
36 [2011] EWHC 2454, para 67, with reference to McKennitt v Ash [2008] QB 73 (CA). 
37 [2011] EWHC 2454, para 85. 
38 [2011] EWHC 2454, para 89. 
39 [2011] EWHC 2454, para 102. 
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One issue which was not determinative, but which raises some interesting issues, is 
the question who has the right of expression:  the Sunday Mirror or the other party to 
the activity?  This was a pertinent point in McKennitt v Ash, and was also raised here.  
Although Mr Justice Nicol did not resolve the issue, the arguments put forward by the 
Claimant are persuasive but arguably not compelling.  As summarised by the judge, 
the argument on behalf of the Claimant was that Ms Storey’s rights were entitled to 
little weight, because: 
While the article had given her account of the relationship with the Claimant, 
it has been published and would be read because of what it said about the 
Claimant.  It was his story rather than hers.
40
 
This is certainly true.  However, the information contributed to a public debate 
concerning the Claimant, and was therefore of value, regardless of the source.  
Moreover, the European Convention on Human Rights does not grade the rights it 
grants:  everyone is entitled to freedom of expression.  There is no qualification that 
the right to freedom expression can only be enjoyed by someone who is already in the 
public eye and therefore commands attention.  The same holds, in reverse, for 
privacy:  we do not accept that only private individuals have a right to privacy.  
Nonetheless, it does produce an uneasy tension when the private individual is seen to 
“cash in” on the fame or notoriety of the public individual and, in cases such as 
McKennitt v Ash, the privacy of the claimant was correctly respected. 
     
Concluding Comments 
In addition to consolidating the jurisprudence on privacy, and illustrating how far the 
law has evolved in just over 10 years, there are a number of further concluding points 
that can be made in relation to this case. 
 
The first is to note, with disappointment, that there was no mention whatsoever of any 
data protection issue.  There now appears to be a fairly consistent approach in privacy 
cases that data protection considerations are side-lined, and treated either as an 
“insurance policy” in case the privacy action fails or as an unnecessary extra where 
the privacy action succeeds.
41
  This has arguably resulted in data protection not even 
being raised by the claimant.  While the claim would no doubt have been met with the 
“special purposes” defence provided in section 32 of the Data Protection Act 1998 for 
journalistic use, it is nevertheless disappointing that the rights and remedies granted in 
the Act are not being fully discussed and applied judicially.
42
 
 
The second area is the issue of whether Ferdinand’s previous disclosures affected his 
right to privacy on this occasion.  It undoubtedly makes sense that one does not 
undermine one’s right to privacy on all issues simply by putting certain information in 
the public domain.  However, there is a sense of unease in the idea that one person 
can unilaterally choose where to draw the line between disclosure and privacy, and it 
is good to note that the courts have demonstrated they can deal with this point 
appropriately in each case.  In some cases, such as McKennitt v Ash, previous 
disclosure of certain information may still render further personal details private.  
Equally, however, as demonstrated in this case and in Campbell, it is necessary to 
                                                 
40 [2011] EWHC 2454, para 81. 
41 Re the former, see Mr Justice Eady in Quinton v Peirce [2009] EWHC 912 (QB), para 3; re the 
latter, see Baroness Hale in Campbell v Mirror Group News [2004] UKHL 22, para 130. 
42 See further Gillian Black, “Data Protection”, in the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Reissue 2010, 
paras 410-416 on “the privacy problem”. 
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have a mechanism to enable false impressions to be corrected.  Accordingly, it is 
submitted that prior disclosure, especially where selective, should continue to be one 
factor in a range of relevant issues which is considered at the stage of balancing the 
privacy and expression interests.   
 
The final point to raise is in relation to open justice, and the increasing concern over 
the use of super- and anonymised injunctions.
43
  While this action was not the subject 
of an anonymised injunction, parts of the judgment have been redacted.  These parts 
primarily refer to certain evidence, which has not been disclosed.  This prevents the 
reader from having access to the full facts on which the judgment was based.  It is 
difficult to tell how significant the redaction has been.  Paragraph 22 is redacted in 
full, but whether it was one line or one hundred is not indicated.  Likewise, 
information in paragraphs 10, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23, 48, 52, 72, 73, 76, 86 96, and 100 
was also redacted, primarily (as far as one can tell) in relation to details of the 
relationship between Ferdinand and Ms Storey, such as the content of text messages 
they exchanged.  While these details may not have been critical to the case, they were 
presumably not entirely irrelevant, since the judge needed to refer to them in setting 
out his judgment.  Lord Neuberger’s report from 20 May 2011 on Super Injunctions, 
Anonymised Injunction and Open Justice
44
 addresses the difficulties of ensuring 
justice is done and is seen to be done, while protecting privacy interests.  The report 
places open justice at the heart of the legal system, while recognising that in some 
cases protecting privacy is essential.  It is suggested that partial redaction is preferable 
to the more extreme response of an anonymised injunction, although for the purposes 
of analysis and discussion the ideal outcome would always be to have access to the 
full report. 
 
That said, today’s news is tomorrow’s fish and chip wrapper, and it is probable that 
Ferdinand’s indiscretions (like Campbell’s and Mosley’s before him) will live on for 
much longer in the case reports and legal analyses than in the world of tabloid 
journalism. 
 
   
Dr Gillian Black 
Lecturer in Law, University of Edinburgh 
   
 
 
  
 
   
                                                 
43 Especially that expressed by the media throughout May and June 2011. 
44 Available at www.judiciary.gov.uk  
